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THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICE 
POWER OF THE STATE 
T HE police power of the state is one of the most difficult phases of our law to understand, and it is even more difficult to 
define it and to place it within any bounds. In speaking of this 
power the court has recently said: 
"It extends not only to regulations which promote the 
public health, morals, and safety, but to those which pro-
mote the public convenience or the general prosperity. * * * 
It is the most essential of powers, at times the most insist-
ent, and always one of the least !imitable of the powers of 
government."1 
The term is nowhere found in our Constitution, and it first 
appears in our jurisprudence slightly less than one hundred years 
ago. It found no place in Bouv~:ER.'s LAW DICTIONARY until 1883, 
and the UNITED S'l'A'l':ES DIG:ES'l' did not contain it until 1879. Yet 
the idea is an old one and played no unimportant part in our Con-
stitutional Convention. 
The idea is embodied in our theory of dual sovereignty. The 
framers of our Constitution were close students of Blackstone, and 
from him they had learned the lesson of divisible sovereignty. Due 
to tne peculiar situation in which they were placed, in that they were 
attempting to unite thirteen distinct sovereignties into one nation, 
they found it not only right but necessary that sovereignty should 
should be divided. It was fortunate that the state constitutions, 
whether they were survivals of colonial days or not, were all made 
with the idea of operating under some form of external authority. 
The common interests alone were committed to the general govern-
ment, and the 'residual sovereignty' which remained with the states 
was the seed from which has grown the immense powers of 'Emi-
nent Domain' and the 'Police Power.' It has been fittingly said 
that the police power-
"was so named by Chief Justice Marshall * * * as a result 
of the perception * * * of the truth that in spite of all con-
stitutional limitations from the side of the central govern-
1 Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137. 
174 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
ment there must remain in the states an indefinite fund of 
legislative and governmental power to provide for the count-
less actual and conceivable emergencies of local government."2 
The idea of the police power is very clearly found in the FEn-
ERALIST.3 
"In this relation (operation of the government) the pro-
posed governme~t cannot be deemed a national one, since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and 
leaves to the states a residuary and inviolable sovereignty 
over all other objects." 
says Madison.3 This 'residual sovereignty' was rightly left with 
the states, but it was never intended that this sovereignty residing 
in the states should ever override any one of those fundamental 
guarantees set down. in the Constitution. Absolute sovereignty 
belongs to neither nation nor state, and should either encroach on 
the limits of the other the basis of our government is weakened. 
The term police power is not found in the court decisions until 
1827, but the idea was clearly in the mind of the Chief Justice when 
he delivered the decision in the Dartnwuth College Case.4 In this 
decision he said : 
"The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain 
the states in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted 
for internal government, and that the instrument they have 
given us is not to be so construed is admitted." 
Again, in the great commercial case of Gibbons v. Ogden5 he said: 
"The acknowledged power of the state to regulate its 
police, its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens may 
enable it to legislate on this subject to a considerable extent." 
Three years later, in 1827, the case of Brown v. Maryland6 was 
2 Hastings, "The Development of Law as Illustrated by the Decisions 
Relating to the Police Power of the State," PROC~DINGS OF TH~ A.MJ;;RICAN 
PHILOSOPHICAL SocmTY, Igoo, No. 39, p-. 379. 
3 Number 39. 
4 4 Wheat. SI8. 
5 9 Wheat. I. 
6 I2 Wheat. 4I9. This case had to do with the validity of a law requiring 
an importer to take out a license from the state before he could sell an 
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decided. Taney's ingenious argument, that to hold the law in ques-
tion unconstitutional would not only strike a blow at the taxing 
power of the state, but would seriously endanger a state's power 
to protect itself from dangerous imports such as gunpowder, was 
not easily answered. Here we "are not interested in Marshall's reply 
to the first point, but in answer to the second he said : 
"The power to direct the removal of gunpowder is a branch 
of the police power which unquestionably remains and ought 
to remain with the states." 
Here for the first time we meet the term police power, and it is 
used to emphasize the doctrine of 'residual sovereignty' applying 
to those cases where the public is to be protected. The term was 
not taken into immediate use, and we do not find it accepted imme-
diately by politicians or judges. In Mr. Calhoun's famous resolu-
tions of December, 1837, he has the idea, but he does not use the 
term. In discussing the relation between slavery and the Union, 
and in seeking for a solution to the already burning question, he 
proposed that, 
"Any intermeddiing of any one or more states, or a combi-
nation of their citizens, with the domestic institutions or 
police of the others on any ground, political, moral, or reli-
gious, should be deemed unconstitutional."7 
In fact, not until the same year, ten years after it had first been 
used, do we meet the term again. In the case of Mayor of City of 
New York v. Miln8 we find Justice Barbour quoting Marshall's own 
words. But while he quotes the former statement he does not adopt 
the term generally, although he entirely accepts the idea of police 
article which had been imported. Such a law Chief Justice Marshall decided 
to be unconstitutional on the ground that it was a tax on imports, and as 
such forbidden by the Constitution. This case is also of interest because 
in it the 'original package doctrine' was first formulated. 
1 Schurz, lliNRY CLAY, Vol. 2, p. 156. 
s II Pet. 102. The question before the court was whether an act, pro-
viding that the master of every ship entering Ne\V York should render, 
within twenty-four hours after arrival, a statement of name, age, etc., of 
all alien passengers, and placing a fine upon his failure to do so, was con-
stitutional. 
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power.9 The end desired by the law in question was to prevent the 
influx of paupers and criminals, and the means as given by law is 
upheld on the basis of protecting the safety, happiness, prosperity, 
and general welfare of the people. Judge Barbour goes so far as 
to say that all' state legislation having this high purpose in view "is 
complete, unqualified, and exclusive." That the term was used in 
this case by mere accident seems evident when we consider that at 
the same term of court was decided the important case of Charles 
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,1° in which the term does not appear. 
But beginning at about this time it became widely used and has since 
then occupied an important place in our jurisprudence. 
It may be asked why did the term and the idea meet at this time 
with such popularity? The answer is to be found in the condition 
of the country at that time. The new Jacksonian party had come 
into power in 1828, and with it had come the doctrines of the fron-
tier. New economic problems had to be faced, and the slavery 
question had become the storm center of the time. But with the 
coming of Jackson the Supreme Court had remained Federalist, 
and the controlling hand of John Marshall still rested on our judi-
cial system. Between 1834 and 1837 the court had changed. Taney 
had become Chief Justice, Wayne had taken Johnson's place, and 
Barbour had succeeded Duval. The last stronghold of Federalism 
had fallen. Marshall had heiJ.rd the last two mentioned cases argued, 
but because four judges had not concurred a rehearing had been 
ordered. According to Story, Marshall judged the laws in question 
to be unconstitutional, yet they were upheld by the new court as 
being proper state enactments. This sudden change on the part of 
the court naturally attracted attention from the public at large, and 
9 In this connection the court says: "A state has the same undeniable 
and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and things within its territorial 
limits as any foreign nation where that jurisdiction is not surrendered or 
restrained by the Constitution of the United States; that by virtue 0£ this 
it is not only the right but the bounden and solemn duty of a state 
to advance the safety, happiness and prosperity 0£ its people, and to pro-
vide for its general welfare by any and every act of legislation which it 
may deem conducive to these ends where the power over particular subjects 
or the manner in which exercised is not surrendered or restrained in the 
manner just stated." 
10 II Pet. 420. . 
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we find not only Congress but the papers speaking of the police 
power. 
The real reason for adopting the police power lay deeper; it lay 
in the great slavery controversy. Not so many years previous the 
New England states had met in the Hartford convention, and threats 
of secession had first been brought forth. But during the interven-
ing years the North had gained numerically, and they were now in 
control. Moreover, they had been thrilled by Webster, and had 
adopted his doctrine of an indissoluble Union. They had to find 
some theory with which they could combat the Southern States 
Rights doctrine, and yet they believed in the 'residual sovereignty' 
of the states. So when the court offered its police power to pacify 
the 'disturbing spirit of slavery,' the North took it for its own. 
Indeed, it has been said that "The term police power was almost as 
much a federalist and a northern expression as state sovereignty was 
anti-federalist and southem."11 Because most of the early cases 
dealing with the police power involved commerce does not prevent 
this from being true. Neither the South nor the courts were anxious 
to have the question discussed at bar, but those cases which did arise 
were decided by the court as undoubtedly the framers of our Con-
stitution would have decided them. To a discussion of two of these 
cases we will now tum. 
The case of Prigg v. P ennsylvania12 contains the next reference 
to police power by our Supreme Court. The case brought before 
the court the fugitive slave law and a state's right to legislate on 
this subject. The court agreed unanimously that the law by which 
the plaintiff had been indicted and found guilty of removing a slave 
by force from Pennsylvania to Maryland was unconstitutional; but 
what they failed to agree on was whether the right of concurrent 
legislation on this subject, so long as it was not contrary to any act 
of Congress, rested with the states. Judge Story delivered the opin-
ion of the court, and having held that the Constitution recognized 
property in slaves, he denied a concurrent power on the part of the 
states, but he e.xpressly says that the court recognizes and will pro-
tect the police power.13 Taney's concurring opinion denies the 
i1 HASTINGS, supra, p. 377. 
12 16 Pet. 539. • 
13 "We are by no means to be understood in any manner whatsoever 
to doubt or interfere with the police power belonging to the states in virtue 
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exclusiveness of Congress to legislate on the question of fugitive 
slaves, and he also discusses the question with reference to the police 
power. We are not interested here in the question of the exclusive-
ness of Congress' commercial power, but the question of interest is 
whether such legislation on the part of the states should be upheld 
as being an exercise of the police power or as being a concurrent 
commercial power residing in the states. In discussing results which 
would follow should the states not be permitted to legislate as to 
fugitive slaves, Taney says: 
"It seems supposed that laws nearly similar to those I have 
mentioned might be passed by the state by virtue of her pow-
ers over her internal police, and by virtue of her right to 
remove from her territory disorderly persons." 
Thompson, as did Daniel, thought that a state had concurrent power 
over this subject. Justice Wayne took an opposing position.14 
- McLean's position is uncertain, as he devotes himself to the ques-
tion whether the purpose of the article in question was to protect 
the slaveholder, and that if this is so an injustice would be worked 
if the enforcement of it was left in the hands of hostile states. The 
court virtually decided to call this power by which a state acted on 
fugitive slaves the police power, and they aligned it with Madison's 
'residual sovereignty.'15 
of their general sovereignty. That police power extends over all the sub-
jects within the territorial limits of the states * * * and * * *'is entirely 
distinguishable from the right and duty of claiming and delivering slaves 
which comes from the general government." 
14 Thompson does not discuss the relation of the subject to the police 
power. Daniel, and here I follow Hastings, freely uses the term police 
power, and "calls attention to the fact that dealing with a fugitive merely 
as such, so long as he neither disturbs or threatens the domestic tranquility, 
is a matter of foreign relations and not of police." "Under such circum-
stances he would not be a proper subject for the exertion of the police power. 
If not challenged under a different power of the state, his escape would be 
inevitable." "If arrested by the exercise of the police power he would, as 
far as he was subjected to that power of the state, be taken out of that of 
his master, and thus the invocation of this police power, so far from securing 
the rights of the master, would be made an engine to insure the deprivation 
of his property." Wayne mentions the police power only in denying to the 
states all right of legislation over this subject except such "as may be of 
strictly police character." 
15 In the discussion of Prigg v. Pennsylvania I have followed Hastings' 
excellent analysis. 
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The case of Moore v. Illinois16 came up in 1852. A law providing 
that no one should harbor a slave or prevent the master from retak-
ing him was upheld as being a "regulation for the restraint and 
punishment of crime, for the preservation of the health and morals 
and the public peace."17 Here we have a peculiar situation: 
"A state law that forbids harboring a slave is due exercise 
of the police power. A state law that forbids a master from 
taking his slave and removing him by force out of the com-
monwealth without the exhibition of some legal process is 
not. And the distinction is to be sought in the nature of a 
power exercised in each case.''18 
The great controlling power of the national government over the 
people is e..'Cercised through the grant of commercial power, that of 
the states is exercised by the police power. While the court tries 
to ascribe separate fields to each, the attempt has never been suc-
cessful and the two are continually coming into conflict. 
Two early cases involved in this struggle are of great interest 
and importance, for we see in them the general attitude of the court 
toward the police power. The License Cases19 involved the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of laws requiring a license to sell liquor. 
As in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the decision was unani-
mous, and again the judges were unab.Ie to decide on any common 
reason upon which they could base their decisions. The court was 
unanimous in its decision that these laws were constitutional, but 
they had the difficulty which will always confront a body of men 
16 14 How. 13. 
i1 Wayne went on to say: "In the exercise of this power, which has 
been denominated the police power, a state has a right to make it a penal 
offense to introduce paupers, criminals or fugitive slaves within their bor-
ders; and to punish those who thwart this policy by harboring, concealing 
or secreting such persons." He does not enter into a discussion of concur-
rent power; he refrains from it when he says: "That the defendant is thus 
subject to two punishments, one by the state and another by the nation, is 
not a good objection, as he is subject to two sovereignties and his act is a 
violation of the laws of each and therefore constitutes two offenses." Jus-
tice McLean dissented on the ground that since Congress has control over 
fugitive slaves the whole question is removed from the police power of the 
state. 
18 HASTINGS, supra, p. 404. 
19 5 How. 504. 
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who feel that they are especially chosen to regulate the relation of 
discordant states, when they are suddenly called upon to fix prac-
tical rights. They were satisfied that the measures were passed by 
virtue of the police power, but again the real question was whether 
the states had a concurrent power over commerce. Taney admits 
such concurrent power.20 McLean advances an entirely new theory, 
and one which is scarcely tenable. He argues that the spheres of 
the nation and the state are different, and that within its own sphere 
each is supreme. So he thinks that these laws are in no sense reg-
ulations of commerce.21 With him agrees Justice Grier. Justice 
Catron agreed with the Chief Justice, while Daniel and Woodbury 
deny any power of concurrent legislation in the states. Taney's 
20 Taney is emphatic in his belief that the states have some power over 
this subject, so long as they do nothing contrary to an act of Congress. In 
referring to Gibbons v. Ogden he says: "Moreover, the court, on pages 205, 
2o6, distinctly admits that a state may in the execution of its police and 
health laws make regulations of commerce, but which Congress may control. 
It is very clear that so far as these regulations are merely internal, and do 
not operate on foreign commerce or commerce among the states, they are 
altogether independent of the power of the general government and cannot 
be controlled by it." In other words, he believes the laws to be regulations 
of commerce, and as such subject to the control of Congress. Later he asks: 
"What are the police powers of a state? They are nothing more or less 
than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent 
of its dominion, and whether a state passes a quarantine law or a law to 
punish offenses * * * or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in 
every case it exercises the same power: that is to say, this power of sov-
ereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its own 
dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates, and its authority 
to make regulations of commerce is as absolute as its power to pass health 
laws, e.."l::cepting so far as it has been restricted by the Constitution of the 
United States." 
21 "A license to sell an article, foreign or domestic, as a merchant, an 
innkeeper or a victualer, is a matter of police and revenue within the power 
of a state." In speaking of the police power and the power of Congress, he 
says: "Neither of them can be so exercised as to materially affect the other. 
The sources and objects of these powers are exclusive, distinct and inde-
pendent, and are essential to both governments. The one operates upon 
foreign commerce, and the other upon the internal concerns of a state * * * 
and if the foreign article be injurious to the health, safety or morals of 
the community, the state may, in the exercise of that great and conservative 
police power which lies at the foundation of its prosperity, prohibit the sale 
of it. * * * Such a regulation must be made in good faith and have for its 
sole object the preservation of the health or morals of society." 
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view seems to be the most practical in that it does not tend toward 
separatism. If the police power is the only authority by which the 
states can legislate, and if it is absolute, every enactment is an exer-
cise of it, and continual clashes with congressional laws are inevi-
table. His decision does not, however, give the sharp distinctions 
which the people at that time wanted, and it left the relation of state 
and nation as undecided as before.22 
This debate was continued two years later in the Passenger Cases.23 
These cases arose because of a law of New York authorizing a tax 
on every person landing in New Yark City, the tax to go to the sup-
port of the marine hospital; and because of a Massachusetts regula-
tion providing that officers be appointed to prevent and idiot or 
person incompetent to earn a living from entering the state, unless 
bond be given that such person would not become a public charge 
within ten years. In an opinion by Justice McLean, the court 
decided that such laws were unconstitutional. The Justice still 
holds to his theory of different spheres, here on the basis that to 
suppose the power of the states to be subordinate to the power of 
the nation "degrades the states by making their legislation to the 
extent stated subject to the will of Congress." But by dwelling on 
the subject of conflicting legislation he adds force to Taney's argu-
ment that the spheres cannot be separate, and at the same time the 
validity of state legislation be made to depend upon its conformity 
to the legislation of Congress. That the police power and the com-
mercial power are different he feels sure. 
"No one has yet drawn the line clearly between the com-
mercial power of the Union and the municipal power of a 
state."2"' 
22 In concluding his discussion of this case, Hastings says: "To appre-
ciate the importance attached to every shred of power by the adherents of 
state and national authority, respectively, the steadily growing slavery dis• 
cussion and sectional bitterness must be kept in mind. The license cases 
are almost precisely contemporary, with the Wilmot proviso, and the mission 
of Mr. Samuel Hoar to South Carolina as agent of the commonwealth of 
Massachusetts to look after the interests of colored seamen, her citizens, 
seized from their vessels in Charleston harbor. He left the city on the 
advice of the city and state authorities that he was not safe, and they could 
not or would not protect him." 
23 7 How. 283. 
24 In referring to the relation of police power and taxation, McLean 
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Justice McLean then finds an exclusive commercial power and an 
exclusive police power; and he depends upon the ingenuity of the 
court to separate them should they become entangled. Little won-
der that four judges could not accept such a task at a time of such 
ardent and heated popular discussion over the status of the states. 
Justice Taney finds that the right of expulsion includes the right 
of exclusion, and in quoting New York v. Miln he holds that th~ 
states have such taxing powers as these laws give.25 Only Justices 
says: "The police power of the state cannot draw within its jurisdiction 
objects which lie beyond it. * * * In guarding the safety, health and morals 
of its citizens a state is restricted to appropriate and constitutional means. 
If extraordinary expenses be incurred an equitable claim to an indemnity 
can give no power to a state to tax objects not subject to its jurisdiction." 
Justices Wayne, Catron, McKinley and Grier filed concurring opinions. Jus-
tice Wayne proclaimed that the states have no concurrent power over com-
merce. In replying to the statement that these laws were passed by virtue 
of the police power, he asks: ''What is the supreme police power of the 
state? It is one of the means used by sovereignty to accomplish that great 
object, the good of the state. ***Police powers, then, and sovereign powers 
are the same. The former being considered as so many particular rights 
under that name or word colfectively placed in the hands of the sovereign. 
* * * How much of it have the states retained? I answer unhesitatingly, all 
necessary to their internal government. Generally, all not delegated by 
them in the articles of confederation to the United States of America; all 
not yielded by them under the Constitution of the United States." Justice 
Catron merely finds these laws a tax on commerce, and Justice Grier con-
curs with him. Justice McKinley thinks that the question of immigration 
and immigrants is solely in the hands of Congress. 
25 Taney closes with a remarkable assertion of the rights of the general 
government: "For all the great purposes for which the federal government 
was founded we are one people with one common country. We are all citi-
zens of the United States, and, as members of the same community, must 
have the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interrup-
tion as freely as in our own states; and a tax imposed by a state for entering 
its territories or harbors is inconsistent with the rights which belong to the 
citizens of other states as members of the union, and with the object which 
that union was instituted to attain. * * * But upon the question that the 
record brings up the judgment in the New York case, as well as that in 
Massachusetts, ought, in my opinion, to be affirmed." Justices Daniel, Nel-
s·on and Woodbury agreed with the Chief Justice in his conclusion. Justice 
Woodbury's opinion is of importance because he suggested the principle 
adopted a few years later in the case of Cooley v. Board of Wardens (12 
How. 299), that the power of Congress over commerce is exclusive only 
when a uniform rule is necessary. 
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Taney and Woodbury fully realized that 'the two powers, different 
though they were, must conflict at times, and the only way to har-
monize them was to make that of commerce supreme and para-
mount. This we have accepted, and we can only account for the 
court's earlier action by remembering that the great sectional strife 
was connected with these decisions and that the policy of the court 
was one of mildness and temperance. 
We have ,gone far enough to see that the development of the 
police power leads into many different fields, that it is a power not 
·to be enclosed within any narrow limits, but that it is a broad and 
comprehensive power, e:i,,i:ending .into every phase of our jurispru-
dence. This makes it very difficult to treat of the police power in 
any one phase, and to show how this police power in its develop-
ment has affected the rights of states and citizens. But unless we 
are to be completely lost in the labyrinth through which the police 
power has gone it is necessary to discuss separately the relation of 
the police power to those rights upon which it has had the most 
influence. With this in view, I have undertaken to point out the 
main effects of the police power on 
I. The Obligation of Contract; 
2. The Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment; 
3. Race Legislation; 
4. The Relation of Employer and Employee. 
It must not be thought that there are distinct barriers between 
these different subjects. In many cases they overlap, but by treat-
ing of them separately we shall come to a clearer knowledge of the 
growth of the police power and what it at present means. 
RltLA'l'ION OF '!'HE POLICE POWER 'l'O '!'HE 0BLIGA'l'ION OF CON'l'RAC'l' 
Chief Justice Marshall has had an immense influence on our coun-
try. His opinions in many cases stand today and are quoted with 
the most profound respect. Perhaps no decision of his has had a 
deeper influence on our law than that rendered in the Dartmouth 
College Case.26 It is unnecessary to take up either the facts or the 
argument of this important contractual decision. The doctrine 
advanced in the d~cision still stands, limited only by the police 
power. The decision itself fastened upon us the doctrine of cor-
20 4 Wheat. 518. 
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porate inviolapility, but Marshall's admission that the states are not 
restrained in regulating their "civil institutions adopted for internal 
government" has limited the above doctrine. 
'rhe case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge21 marks the 
first step in limiting the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case. 
Here it was held that while a charter is binding yet it carries with 
it no exclusive right beyond that expressly stated, and that in inter-
pretation a charter is to be considered as carrying nothing by impli-
cation. 
The first step taken by our courts in placing limits upon the 
inviolability of contract by virtue of the police power was in the 
case of Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co.28 In this case the court 
held that a state may legally add additional duties to those pre-
scribed in a charter, provided these restrictions are made by virtue 
of the police power. The coming of the war and the reconstruc-
tion put a stop to cases involving contractual rights, and it was not 
until 1877 that we agaill meet an important contractual decision. 
As we shall see, the court had become thoroughly familiar with the 
doctrine and name of the police power, and from this time the con-
21 II Pet. 420. 
28 27 Vt. 140 (1855). The question at issue was whether a state might 
require railroads to fence their tracts and put cattle-guards at all crossings, 
if such restrictions were made after a charter, which had no such provisions. 
had been granted. The court found that control over railroads in this respect 
existed in the state legislature by virtue of "the general control over the 
police of the country." That this is "a responsibility of which the legisla-
tures cannot divest themselves, if they would." The "police power of the 
state" is found to extend "to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, com-
fort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the 
state"; that with regard to railroads "this police power, which resides pri-
marily and ultimately in the legislature, is twofold": first, "the police of the 
roads" exercised by the railroads themselves in absence of "legislative con-
trol"; second, "the general police power of the state, by which persons and 
property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to 
secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state. Of the per-
fect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was or, upon 
acknowledged general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural per-
sons are concerned." And as the court had already shown that a railroad 
company has no more rights than an individual, the same applies to railroad 
companies. The court grants that a franchise is private property, and its 
right of protection as such, but it is firm in refusing to adopt a construction 
which would put corporate interests beyond legislative control. 
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test between the inviolability of contract and the police power 
becomes ?- deadly one. 
Two cases decided in this year introduce the question whether or 
not a state by granting charters, and thus establishing contractual 
relations, can bargain away its police power. The case of Beer Co. 
v. M assachusetts20 brought forward the liquor question again. The 
company had been granted its franchise as a brewing company 
years before, and when a prohibitory liquor law was passed it 
claimed that the state was destroying its franchise by forbidding 
the sale of its product in Massachusetts. The court decided that 
the state, having reserved the right to alter or repeal the franchise, 
might forbid the sale of the product; and further, that a state could 
not bargain away its right to control liquor, the control of which 
falls under the police power. The case of Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde -
Park30 carried this principle into a new field. The company had 
been granted a charter to locate and carry on business for fifty 
years. Their land ;finally came within the village of Hyde Park, 
and the village forbade the company to carry their materials through 
the streets. This ordinance was upheld. The court pointed out 
that there was no provision preventing such an ordinance, and had 
there been one it would probably be void as an illegal limitation on 
the police power. 
The point in question was decided in Stone v. Mississippi.31 The 
state had granted a franchise to conduct a lottery for twenty-five 
years, and for this she had been paid. Aftenvard a new constitu-
29 97 u. s. 25. 
30 97 u. s. 659. 
31 IOI U. S. 814. In rendering the decision in this case Chief Justice 
Waite said: "The doctrines of Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
announced by this court more than sixty years ago have become so imbedded 
in the jurisprudence of the United States as to make them to all intents and 
purposes a part of the Constitution itself." We can only reconcile this state-
ment to the decision rendered here by remembering that the earlier case does 
not refer to any act which could be based on the 'residual sovereignty' 
residing in the states, and by remembering that Chief Justice Marshall really 
prepared the way, though unknowingly, for the latter development, when 
he said: "The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the 
states in the regulation of their civil institutions adopted for internal gov-
ernment, and that the instrument they have given us is not to be so construed 
is admitted." 
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tion had been adopted forbidding lotteries. The court quoted the 
two previous cases and held that a state cannot be limited by such 
a contract and that no contract of a state can limit the police power.32 
Stone v. Mississippi did not survive without some limitations. The 
old struggle was brought up again in r885 in the cases of New 
Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., Louisville Gas Co. v. Citi-
zens Gas Co., and New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers.33 In 
the first two cases exclusive franchises for laying gas mains and 
supplying gas to the city had been granted; in the last an exclusive 
franchise was granted for supplying water. Had the court fol-
lowed the precedent established in Stone v. Mississippi, the injunc-
tions to prevent other people from laying the gas mains or water 
pipes would not have been granted; but the injunctions were 
granted on the basis that the first franchises were binding contracts. 
It is conceded that the supply of light and water is included in the 
'widest_ definition' of the police power. What then did the court 
mean? How could these injunctions be granted when the court 
had expressly stated that the police power could not be bargained 
away? It is admitted that the supply of gas and water has rela-
tion to health and even to morals, but this connection is held to be 
too slight to restrain the application of the Dartmouth College Case.34 
Under these decisions we have two kinds of police power: first, 
that which is closely connected with the public health, safety, and 
morals cannot be bargained away; second, that which has to do 
with the general welfare can be alienated. A number of cases arose 
to which this principle was applied.35 The second point above was 
3 2 The rule of Stone v. Mississippi was very emphatically upheld in the 
case of Butchers Union Company v. Crescent City Company, III U. S. 746. 
One legislature had granted an exclusive franchise to the Crescent City 
Company; a few years later another legislature repealed this grant. In the 
Slaughter-House cases the first act had been upheld; now the Supreme 
Court upheld the second act. Slaughter-houses were judged to be fit objects 
of legislative control, and the court held that a legislature could not be 
bound by an exclusive franchise granted by a previous legislature. 
33 II5 U. S. 650, 683, 674. 
34 It seems as if the supply of water and gas would have as close a rela-
tion to public health and morals as butchering, but Justice Harlan says that 
the original franchise in the Butchers Union Company case was upheld 
merely as a police regulation, and as such it was repeatable. 
3 5 New Orleans v. Houston, n9 U. S. 265. The court decided that 
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amended in the case of Honie Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles.36 The 
telephone company had a franchise extending for a long period of 
years. The city reduced the rates below those established by the 
franchise. When the case reached the Supreme Court it was held 
that the rates could be reduced because the franchise had been 
granted for too long a time. In other words, that portion of the 
police power which refers to the general welfare cannot be alienated 
for too long a period, but no length of time was set, and it was but 
a few years before the court came back to the principles of Stone 
v. Mississippi. 
This principle was reestablished in the case of Atlantic Coast Line 
R. Co. v. Goldsboro.37 The railroad company had been granted 
certain rights by the city of Goldsboro, and these rights were later 
withdrawn. In upholding this ordinance, Justice Pitney, speaking 
for the court, said: 
"For it is settled that neither the 'contract' clause nor the 
'due process' clause has the effect of overriding the power 
of the state to establish all regulations that are reasonably 
while a state could not bargain away its right to abolish a lottery, it could 
do away with its right to tax it, and that on the matter of taxation the rule 
of Stone v. Mississippi did not apply. St. Tammany Water-Works Com-
pany v. New Orleans Water-Works, 120 U. S. 64. Gas and water com-
panies may enjoin their franchises against any exercise of the police power. 
To this extent the obligation of contract won over the police power. Otis 
v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606. The court upheld a provision in the California 
State Constitution making void all contracts for the sale of corporate stock 
on margin or for future delivery, and authorizing a recovery of any money 
paid on such contracts. "If the state thinks that an admitted evil cannot 
be prevented by prohibiting a calling or transaction not in itself necessarily 
objectionable, the courts cannot interfere, unless, in looking at the substance 
of the matter, they can see that it is a clear, unmistakable infringement of 
rights secured by fundamental law." Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 
223. The facts of the case are similar to those of Fertilizing Company v. 
Hyde Park, only here we have a gas company. The court held that the 
city could not by virtue of the police power of the state attack the gas 
company, but it said that the "right to exercise police power is a continuing 
one, and a business lawful today may because of a changed situation become 
a menace to public health and welfare and be required to yield to public 
good." Here we have an intimation that the second point in the gas and 
water cases will be changed. 
36 2II U. S. z65. 
37 232 u. s. 548. 
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necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, 
or general welfare of the community; that this power can 
neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable 
even by express grant; and that all contract and property 
rights are held subject to its fair exercise." 
Words more sweeping have seldom been used. The only protection 
that is left to vested rights is found in the court's review of the 
reasonableness of legislation. 
One more case is worthy of notice, that of Union Dry Goods Co. 
v. Georgia Public Seri.dee Corporation.88 The. service corporation 
had contracted to supply light to the dry goods company for five 
years. The rates were raised, and judged to be reasonable by the 
State Railroad Commission. The Supreme Court sustained the 
rates. After citing a number of cases, Justice Clarke said: 
"These decisions, a fe\y from the mariy of like effect, 
should suffice to satisfy the most skeptical and belated inves-
tigator that the right of private contract must yield to the 
exigencies of the public welfare when determined in an 
appropriate manner by the authority of the state." 
The decisions mentioned cover roo years-at one end we have 
the· Dartmouth College Case declaring for corporate inviolability; 
at the other, the Union Dry Goods Case making the 'Obligation 
of Contract' almost subservient to that vast state power, the Police 
Power. The various acts by which the cited cases arose are not 
materially different, the interpretation has changed. It would seem 
that those who hold that the -Supret;t"Ie Court is, in the final analysis, 
a law-making body are correct. 
RELATION OF THE POLICE POWER 'l'O THE INTERPRETATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
During the War between the States there was _little development 
of the subject of which we are treating. But immediately after-
ward the question of the status of the Southern States arose. The 
Thirteenth Amendment had been passed in December, 1865. This 
prohibited slavery or involuntary servitude except in case of punish-
ment for crime .. The majority in Congress had become accustomed 
38 248 u. s. 372. 
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to the assertion of authority, and when they realized that they were 
failing "to reap the results of the war," and that President Johnson 
was following the plan of Lincoln in restoring the Southern States 
to their constitutional status, the Civil Rights· Act of 1866 was 
passed. This bill 
"was a plain announcement to the Southern legislatures that, 
as against their project of setting the freedmen apart as a 
special class, with a status at law corresponding to their 
status in fact, the North would insist on exact equality 
between the races in civil status, regardless of any consid-
eration of fact."39 
This bill was vetoed by the President, and then passed over his veto. 
In order to assure it of constitutionality, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was passed by Congress, and in a most questionable fashion it 
was ratified by the states. The first section of this amendment is the 
one in which we are interested.40 
Before we take up the interpretation· of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment with reference to the police power, a slight digression will 
be helpful. Probably the· primary reason for the adoption of the 
Constitution was a determination to guarantee the property right. 
Most of the recent cases involving this right of ownership have 
arisen under the Fourteenth Amendment, but there was one early 
state decision worthy of note. 
The state courts were late in adopting the term police power; 
they held to the old common law doctrines. The second state deci-
sion in which the term police power was used 1s Commonwealth v. 
Alger.41 This case, Hastings says, 
"furnishes a starting point for citations directly relating to 
the police power in most of the constitutional discussions 
that embrace the subject."42 
39 DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND EcoNOMIC, p. 63. 
40 The first section reads as follows: "No state shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of Citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, libercy or 
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
41 7 Cush. (Mass.) 53 ( I851). 
~2 HASTINGS, siipra, p. 418. 
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The question referred to the relationship of private real estate and 
general welfare. A law had been passed by Massachusetts which 
forbade the erection or placing of any materials for a wharf in 
Boston harbor. The defendant had been found guilty of violating 
this provision, and he brought the case before the supreme court 
of the state, and argued that the wharf was on his land and would 
not interfere with the right of way of ships. Justice Shaw decided 
that the law was a valid exercise of the police power, and in this 
connection he said: 
"We think it is a settled principle, grmving out of the 
nature of well-ordered society, that every holder of prop-
erty, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds 
it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so 
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoy-
ment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of 
their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. 
* * * The power we allude to is rather the police power, 
the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution, to 
make * * * laws * * * not repugnant to the Constitution as 
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the com-
monwealth and of the subjects of the same."43 
We now return to the Fourteenth Amendment. The judges were 
sympathetic with the results of the war in so far as they estab-
lished the principles of territorial sovereignty, but they were not 
ready to see the states become powerless and the whole theory of 
our Constitution destroyed. Fortunate indeed were we in having 
such a man as Justice Miller, who in a time of great national dis-
turbance was able to foresee the inherent danger of this new amend-
ment, and who had the courage to place himself in the path of rad-
icalism and check it. 
The first cases to arise under the amendment were the Slaitghter-
H oitse Cases.44 The State of Louisiana had created a corporation, 
the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Com-
43 Again he says: "But he is restrained, not because the public have 
occasion to make like use or any use of the property, or to take any benefit 
or profit to themselves from it, buf because it would be a noxious use con• 
trary to the maxim, 'Sic utere tieo, 1tt alie1mm 1101i laedas.'" 
44 16 Wall. 18. 
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pany, to which it granted a monopoly within New Orleans of the 
landing and slaughtering of animals for food. The company could 
permit any other person 'to kill animals in their slaughter-houses, 
and a maximum charge was set. The butchers of New Orleans 
contended that the law "abridged" their "privileges and immuni-
ties" as "citizens of the United States." This law was upheld by 
a bare majority of one, Justice Miller rendering the decision. Jus-
tice Miller says that the amendment might be so construed as to 
leave the states the "mere shell of legislative power." He then 
reviews the history of the adoption of the reconstruction amend-
ments. Ne..'Ct he turns to the really important point. He decided 
that there is a line between state citizenship and national citizen-
ship; that the Fourteenth Amendment gave no added protection 
to the citizens of the states as such. 
"Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states that 
whatsoever those rights as you grant or establish them for 
your own citizens, or as you limit or qualify or impose 
restrictions on their exercise, the same neither more nor less 
shall be the measure of the rights of citizens of other states 
within your jurisdiction." 
This simply extended to the citizens of the United States the pro-
tection given to citizens of the other states as contained in Article 
4, Section 2, Clause I, of the Constitution.45 
The real point here was, granting that this law establishes a 
monopoly which violates common right, does the Supreme Court 
under the Fourteenth Amendment have authority to deal with it, 
and is such state action forbidden by the amendment? The majority 
answered this question in the negative.46 This decision rendered 
valueless the 'privileges and immunities' clause in extending the 
4G This clause reads as follows: "The citizens of each state shall be 
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states." 
46 The dissenting judges undoubtedly interpreted this amendment as the 
framers of it had intended. It was passed in order to prevent a state from 
passing any hostile legislation toward any class. Justice Field's dissenting 
opinion is strong and follows this idea. He argued that the amendment 
protected the rights of all citizens of the state by virtue of their being citi-
zens of the United States. Had this principle been adopted, and a broad 
construction rendered, the police power of the state would have been 
destroyed. The court seems to have remembered Madison's statement that 
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national power at the expense of that of the states.47 As a result, 
attention was turned to the other provisions, and in interpreting 
these the Supreme Court has not been slothful in allowing room 
for the police power. 
The attention of the court was now turned to the question of the 
legality of a state regulating the rates of railroads and private busi-
nesses. In this field we meet the most important development of 
the police power under the Fourteenth Amendment. Before taking 
up the main cases on this point it will be well to mention two cases 
that arose soon after the Slaughter-House decisions. In Railroad 
Co. v. Fuller,48 the court"held that it was not illegal for a state to 
require a railroad to post its rates once a year and to force the rail-
road to abide by them. Such legislation is a valid exercise of the 
police power.40 And in Railroad, Co. v. Maryland50 the court decided 
that the state, in granting a franchise to the Baltimore & Ohio to 
construct a branch from Baltimore to Washington, had the power 
to say what rate could be charged, and furthermore the state could 
require a_ certain per cent of the passenger charges to be paid to it, 
for the railroads are the work of people who receive their authoriza-
tion from the state.51 Justice Bradley always held that regulation 
"if they (the states) were abolished, the general government would be com-
pelled, by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper 
jurisdiction." FEDERALIST, No. 14-• 
47 In the case of Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129, the principle of the 
Slaughter-House cases was upheld. The defendant had been convicted of 
selling liquor. He appealed the case and argued that he had owned the liquor 
prior to the date when selling was made illegal, and that as a citizen of the 
United States he was deprived of his 'privileges and immunities' as guaranteed 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Miller gave the decision, and he again 
made the distinction between state and national citizenship, declaring that 
the conviction was warranted. 
48 17 Wall. 56o. 
49 In this connection Judge Swayne said: "It is not in the sense of the 
Constitution in any wise a regulation of commerce. It is a public regulation, 
and as such forms a portion of the 'immense mass of legislation which 
embraces everything within the territory of the state and not surrendered 
to the general government,' all which can be most advantageously exercised 
by the states themselves." He admits that there is concurrent power which 
when exercised by the states must be called "police power,'' and when exer-
cised by Congress "commercial power." 
50 21 Wall. 456, 470. 
51 With regard to the state charging a certain per cent, Justice Bradley 
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of such rates was a question for the states, and that the reasonable-
ness of the rates was a matter for the legislature to decide. We 
shall see this doctrine modified. 
The case upon which our state rate regulation is based is Munn 
v. Illinois.r. 2 The question at issue here was whether or not the 
state legislature might regulate the maximum charges for storage 
of grain in cities. It was argued that such a law deprived the owners 
of their property and denied to them 'the equal protection of the 
laws.' This case is of particular interest because in it Chief Justice 
Waite gives to the police power an historical definition. He argued 
that the principles of the Fourteenth Amendment are as old Magna. 
Charta and form a part of all state constitutions; that the state 
legislatures possess the supremacy of Parliament in so far as they 
are not limited by the Constitution, and such regulations are not 
within the limitations. Two main principles were laid down in this 
case: the legislature of a state may, through its police power, regu-
late the charges of a business affecting public interest; and the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of these rates is one for the legislature 
to decide. This leaves to the Supreme Court the question of whether 
the business is public in nature.53 
We have noticed how in the early railroad cases the police power 
was adjudged not to violate the commerce clause. This victory was 
not of long duration. In 1886 the case of Wabash, St. Louis & P. 
says: "It has discretion as to the amount of that compensation; that dis-
cretion is a legislative, a sovereign discretion, and in its very nature is 
unrestricted and uncontrolled." 
r.2 94 U. S. IIJ. 
r.a The other Granger cases were decided on the same principles. In 
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, a law estab-
lishing maximum rates was upheld. The law was resisted as impairing the 
contract in the charter, and for the reasons urged in Munn v. Illinois. Since 
no immunity was given in the charter, the court decided that no immunity 
could be implied. The .court further said : "This road, like the warehouse 
in that case [Munn v. Illinois], is situated within the limits of a single state. 
Its business is carried on there and its regulation is a matter of domestic 
concern. It is employed in state as well as in interstate commerce, and until 
Congress acts the state must be permitted to adopt such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the 
people within its own jurisdiction, even though in so doing those without 
may be indirectly affected." 
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Ry. Co. v. Illinois54 came before the court, and in the decision we 
find the first shift from the position adopted in the earlier cases. 
Here it was decided that no state could regulate the charges of 
transportation of goods taken beyond the state, and that they could 
not even regulate the charges for the distance carried in the state.55 
In the case of Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby County56 it was 
held that the only way in which a state can act on interstate com-
merce is through its police power. But this does not extend to the 
laying of a tax with the view of preventing anyone from exercising 
his right of engaging in interstate commerce. 
The victory of commerce over police power went still ftirther. 
In the case of Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.51 the court 
held that a state's police power·did not extend to the point of inter-
ference with the right of a man in another state to ship liquor into 
the state. The fact that Congress had not regulated this subject 
was judged to mean that Congress had meant it to go unregulated, 
and unregulated it should go until Congress acted. And in Kidd v. 
Pearson,58 although the same law was involved, the court held that 
the police power extended to the prevention of manufacturing of 
liquor within its own borders, although such liquor was to be sent 
to another state and there sold. There seems to be a strange incon-
sistency here, for in the second case police power applies to the reg-
ulation of that which in no way could harm the citizens of the state, 
while in the first case it does not apply to that which might easily 
harm them. The explanation lies in the paramount authority of 
Congress to regulate interstate commerce.59 
54 u8 U. S. 557. 
55 An extension of this principle is found in the Shreveport Rate Case, 
234 U. S. 342, where it was held that a railroad cannot charge lower rates 
per mile in a state than it does for interstate business, even though inter-
state rates have been decided reasonable, and intrastate rates are fixed by 
the State Commerce Commission. 
56 I20 U. S. 489. 
57 I25 U. S. 465. 
5 8 I28 U. S. I. 
59 Just preceding these cases the Supreme Court had decided the case of 
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465. Here a state law requiring an engineer 
to be examined and procure a license before he drove a locomotive within 
the state was upheld. Smith had violated this law, and he was engaged in 
interstate commerce alone; nevertheless, the law was judged to apply. The 
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The case of M1tgler v. Kansas60 really ended the fight of the liquor 
men against prohibitory state legislation. Here the court went to 
great length in showing the bad effect of liquor, and it decided that 
when the value of property was injured through a lawful exercise 
of the police power the damage was merely consequential. Two 
propositions were made clear: (r) that by the Fourteenth Amend-
court said: "There are many cases where the acknowledged powers of a 
state may be exerted and applied in such a manner as to affect foreign or 
interstate commerce without being intended to operate as commercial regu-
lations. If their operation in such cases regulate such commerce so as to 
conflict with the regulation of the same subject by Congress, either as 
expressed by positive laws or implied from the absence of legislation, such 
legislation on the part of the state to the e..-.;:tent of such conflict must be 
regarded as annulled." It would seem evident that in a case of this nature 
the law in question refers to a condition where public safety. is endangered, 
and that when this is the case a state may pass restrictions which affect 
interstate commerce. The court upheld the decision of Bowman v. Railroad 
Co. in Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, and to it they applied Brown v. Mary-
land, holding that the right to import involves the right to sell. Rahrer Case, 
140 U. S. 545. Rahrer, as an agent, had sold liquor shipped from another 
state in the original package. Just before this the "Wilson Bill" had been 
passed. This bill provided that liquors from other states should be subject 
on arrival to the operation of the laws of the state into which they had been 
shipped. In speaking of the police power, Justice Fuller said that it is "The 
power to impose restraints and burdens upon persons and property in the 
conservation and promotion of public health, good order and prosperity. It 
belonged originally to the states, has never been surrendered to the govern-
ment nor directly restrained, and is essentially exclusive. * * * In short, it 
is not to be doubted that the power to make the ordinary regulations of 
police remains with the individual states and cannot be assumed by the 
national government, and in this respect it is not interfered with by the 
Fourteenth Amendment." He finds the commercial power exclusive "when 
the subjects of that power are national in their nature." Later he says: "If 
a law passed by a state in the exercise of its acknowledged powers comes 
into conflict with that will, Congress and the state cannot occupy the posi-
tion of equal opposing sovereignties, because the Constitution declares its 
supremacy." If it is exclusive, the police power does not enter the sphere 
of congressional supremacy, but in allowing for this conflict, after having 
stated that the police power is exclusive, the court contradicts itself, and 
really makes the police power subject to the federal government. In the 
case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 3II, 
the court held that a state might forbid all shipments of intoxicating liquors, 
and upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act of March l, 1913, providing for this, 
whether the liquor was in the original package or not. 
00 123 u. s. 623. 
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ment a state had lost none of its police power; ( 2) prohibiting or 
otherwise regulating liquor in the state is a valid exercise of the 
police power.61 
The Granger Cases decided that where rates were set by the legis-
lature there was no question for judicial review.62 The overthrow 
of this proposition took place as follows : The State of Minnesota 
established a railroad commission to regulate rates of transportation. 
This commission was to hav.e sole charge of the reasonableness of 
the rates. A case arose under this act and the railroad argued that 
the rates as set by the Commission were an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of property. In this case, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. 
Minnesota,63 the court held itself bound by; the state court's decision 
that rates set by the commission were final if the law was valid, 
but the court held, in reversing the decision, that in such a case the 
reasonableness of rates is a question for judicial review, and this 
question couid be appealed on the ground that the question was one 
of law and not one of fact.64 
In the case of Reagen. v. Farmers Loan and Trust Co.65 we again 
have rates set by a commission, but the· court decided that whether 
the rates were set by commission or not, the subject of reasonable-
ness of rates is a question for judicial review. The court having 
,decided to review such legislation, which up to this point refers to 
61 The court in Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, upheld a law pro-
hibiting the making or sale of oleomargarine colored to imitate butter. 
6 2 This principle was adhered to in Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517. 
63 134 u. s. 418, 462. 
64 The court said: "It deprives the company of its rights to an investi-
gation by due process of law. * * *' The question of reasonableness of a rate 
of charge for transportation by a railroad company, involving as it does 
the element of reasonableness both as regards the company and as regards 
the public, is eminently a question for judicial investigation, requiring due 
process of law for its determination." This review of reasonableness seems 
to be confined to the fLxing of rates, for in the case of New York & N. E. 
Ry. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, the c~urt upheld a law authorizing a rail-
road commission to require, under certain conditions, grade crossings to be 
removed and replaced. The court seems to indicate that it will refuse to 
look into the reasonableness of a police act which has been affirmed by the 
state courts, when the provisions of the act are confined to health, safety 
and morals. Here we see a similarity to the rule advanced in New Orleans 
Water-Work Co. v. Rivers. · 
65 154 u. s. ·362. 
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intrastate commerce, had to determine what a reasonable rate is. 
This was done in Snz.'.yth v. Ames.66 This case overturned Mmm v. 
Illinois so far as it refers to railroads, for a railroad business is an 
object of public interest, and as it has to serve the public on fair 
terms, railroad property is quasi-public property. The court will 
see to it that no rates are set so low as to prevent a fair return, for 
othenvise confiscation would take place. A fair return is the cur-
rent rate of interest on the value of property that is used for the 
public.67 
It might be well to complete here the discussion of the legality of 
a state fixing railroad rates. Smyth v. Ames provided for some 
separation between intrastate and interstate commerce. The difficul-
ties iri the way of such a separation led the court to suggest in the 
ll1innesota· Rate Cases68 that the two were so blended as perhaps to 
make it necessary for Congress to regulate both in order to have 
effective regulation, but that in absence of congressional action the 
states were free to set maximum intrastate rates for interstate car-
riers. Furthermore, in this case a reasonable rate was described as 
one which gives a fair return on the value of the property, and 
such value includes the current rate of interest on the value of a 
going concern, less deterioration. The Shreveport Rate Case69 
decided positively that in regulating interstate commerce Congress, 
through the Interstate Commerce Commission, could regulate any 
66 169 u. s. 466. 
67 "We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to reasonable-
ness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under 
legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property being used by it 
for the convenience of the public. And in order to ascertain that value, the 
original cost of construction, the amount expended in .Permanent improve-
ments, the amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, the present as 
compared with the original cost of construction, the probable earning 
capacity of the property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and 
the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for considera-
tion, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each case. 
We do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded in esti-
mating the value of the property. What the company is entitled to ask is a 
fair return upon the value which it employs for the public convenience. On 
the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no more be 
exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the services rendered 
are reasonably worth." 
68 230 u. s. 352. 
69 234 u. s. 342. 
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intrastate rates which were discriminatory. From this we are able 
to see that when commerce enters the field the police power leaves. 
With regard to railroads, Mitnn v. Illinois is overturned, but -with 
regard to other businesses only the provision that the reasonableness 
of such regulations is not subject to judicial review has been over-
turned. 
The court has repeatedly held that a legislature has wide discre-
tion in classifying objects with which it may interfere on the 
grounds of preserving the- public health, safety and morals.70 A 
state may pick out the business which it will regulate. Regulations 
have been passed affecting the milk business,71 requiring a railroad 
company to move the foundation of a bridge so as to widen the 
channel,72 requiring all physicians to register,73 forbidding burial 
of dead within city limits ;74 making a telegraph company liable for 
damages suffered by a sender if his telegram is not delivered ;75 fix-
70 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133· "Whenever the public interest demands 
it, and in this particular a large discretion is vested in the legislature to 
determine not only what the interests of the public require but what meas-
ures are necessary for the protection of such interests." 
71 N. Y. ex rel. Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552. In upholding 
this regulation affecting the milk business, Justice Day said: "Nor do we 
think there is force in the contention that the plaintiff in error has been 
denied the equal protection of the laws because of the allegation that the 
milk business is the only business dealing in foods which is thus regulated 
by the sanitary code. * * * It is primarily for the state to select the kinds 
of business which shall be subjects of regulation, and if the business affected 
is one which may be properly the subject of such legislation, it is no valid 
objection that similar regulations are not imposed upon other businesses of 
a different kind." 
72 Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 200 U. S. 561. 
'13 Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173· "Police power of the states 
extends to the regulation of certain trades and callings, particularly those 
which closely concern public health. * * * Classification of the subjects of 
such legislation, so long as such classification h'as a reasonable basis and: is 
not merely arbitrary selection without real difference between the subjects 
included and those omitted from the law, does not deny to the citizens the 
equal protection of the laws,'' citing Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 
which upheld a law prohibiting a certain class of drumming or soliciting of 
business on trains. 
74 Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco, 216 U. 
s. 358. 
75 W estem Union Telegraph Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U. 
s. 4o6. 
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ing maximum rates of interest ;76 requiring every state bank to 
contribute to bank depositors' guaranty fund;77 requiring two feet 
of space on outside of rails of coal mines ;78 fixing weight of stand-
. ard loaf of bread.79 
These are but a few of many specific regulations placed by the 
state on private business affecting public interest, all of them upheld 
by the Supreme Court as coming within the police power of the 
state. In the case of the German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis8° 
the court went even further. Here it was decided that a business 
may be so far affected with a public interest as to permit legislative 
regulation of its rates and charges, although no public trust is 
imposed upon the property and although the public may not have 
a legal right to demand and receive service, and that the business 
of fire insurance is so far affected with a public interest as to 
justify legislative regulation of its rates. 
One of the main restrictions on the state in the exercise of this 
power is the definition of liberty given by the Supreme Court in 
the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana.81 Liberty is broadly defined as 
"not only the right of the citizen to be free from mere phys-
ical restraint of his person, but the term is deemed to 
embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment 
of his faculties, to be free to use them in all lawful ways, 
to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by 
any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and 
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be 
proper or necessary and essential for his carrying out to a 
successful conclusion the purposes above mentioned.'' 
Even this liberty may at times be trampled on; for instance, it does 
not prevent a man from being vaccinated against his will. 82 
1a Griffith v. State of Connecticut, 218 U. S. 563. 
11 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 
1s Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U. S. 26. 
79 Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578. 
80 233 u. s. 389. 
81165 u. s. 578. 
82 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. II. The court cites Hannibal & 
St. J. Ry. Co. v. Rusen, 95 U. S. 465, and Thorpe v. Rutland, 27 Vt. 140: 
"Persons and property are subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in 
order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state; of 
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With regard to monopolies the court has decided that a state may 
not regulate a business on the basis that while a perfectly reason-
·able charge is made so far as value of services rendered is con-
cerned, yet if the business grows large profits from the charges 
may be cut. A state may regulate the business as a whole, but it 
cannot distinguish between a large and a small business.83 
There is one other point of importance which must be touched 
upon. By Eubank v. Richmond84 it was decided that the police 
power does not extend to resthetic considerations. 85 But in a very 
recent decision86 the court seems inclined to broaden the police 
power to cover this field if policy can be found to support it. 87 
From this discussion two or three points seem evident. It is 
clear that the court is very jealous of the congressional power over 
interstate commerce, but it is equally evident that even though inter-
state commerce prevails as against the police power, the court has 
looked upon the police power very favorably when other businesses 
are to be regulated. 
the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was or 
upon acknowledged general principles ever can be made, so far as natural 
persons are concerned." 
83 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79. A· general 
rule for the regulation of monopolies on th~ part of the state was laid down 
in Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86. In this case it was decided 
that a state legislature may provide their own methods of procedure and 
determine the methods and means by which their legislation may be made 
effective, subject only to the qualifications that this procedure must not work 
a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict specifically with provisions of the 
Federal Constitution. The fixing of fines, so long as they are not grossly 
excessive, is also within the police power of the state. 
84 226 u. s. 137. 
85 "JEsthetic considerations are a matter of luxury and indulgence rather 
than of necessity, and it is necessity alone which justifies the exercise of 
the police power to take private property without compensation." 
86 St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269. 
87 Justice Holmes, in upholding a law regulating billboards, said: "It 
is true that according to the bill the plaintiff has done away with dangers 
from fire and wind, but apart from the question whether those dangers d:o 
not remain sufficient, they are or may be the least of the objections adverted 
to in the cases." This seems to indicate a tendency to broaden police power 
to resthetic purposes if policy can be found to support it. "Possibly one or 
two details * * * have resthetic conditions in view more than anything else. 
But as the main burdens stand on other grounds," etc. 
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Tn PoLici;: Powi;:R AND R.Aci;: LE:GISLA'l'ION 
Anyone who is at all familiar with the history of the War between 
the States and Reconstruction realizes that the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments were passed in order to establish 
the politiCal equality of the negroes. The amendments have been 
of great importance in other respects, but so far as they have been 
used with reference to negro legislation they have primarily affected 
the South, against which they were directed. It has been very for-
tunate for that section that the Supreme Court has given the police 
power such a wide range, and due to this power the South has so . 
far been able to ward off the danger arising from her large negro 
population. 
Cases affecting the negroes were much more numerous forty 
years ago than today, and the court thought then that few cases 
which did not refer to negro legislation88 would come before them 
under the amendments. This was a mistaken idea, for because of 
such legislation many interesting and important cases have come 
before the court. The court has, as I have said, made liberal allow-
ance for this legislation. Perhaps no case shows this more clearly 
than United States v. Reese.89 Here an act of Congress fixing pun-
ishment for ·hindering voting under the Fifteenth Amendment was 
declared unconstitutional because it did not distinguish between 
discrimination on account of color and other -discrimination. The 
court stated that the power of Congress to act on this subject 
extended only to race discrimination. 
The same principle won in the case of United States v. Cruik-
shank.90 Here the defendants were charged with having violated 
a federal law that no people should intimidate others so as to hinder 
them in the exercise of their rights. The defendants were brought 
before the court on thirty-two counts-preventing persons from 
bearing arms, depriving them of liberty, etc. The court achnitted 
ss In the Slaughter-House cases, Judge Miller said: "We doubt very 
much whether any action of a state not directed by way of discrimination 
against the negro as a class or on account of their race will ever be held 
to come within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision 
for that race and that emergency that a strong case will be necessary for 
its application to any other." 
s9 92 U. S. 214 
90 92 u. s. 542. 
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that for some offenses a man might be amenable to both nation and 
state, but the offenses as charged were waived aside on the ground 
that the protection of the citizens of a state rests with the state, 
that discrimination on account of race was not shown, and that the 
proof was too vague to allow conviction. 
In Hall v. DeCuir91 we find the beginning of the decisions by 
which separate travel accommodations for the races has been 
upheld. Louisiana had enacted a law that no one should be refused 
admission to or expelled from a public conveyance because of race. 
Mrs. DeCuir was refused admission to cabins reserved for white 
ladies, .and for this she sued the owner of the steamboat. The 
court decided that such a law was an interference with the power 
of Congress over interstate commerce, and as such there was no 
ground for suit. 92 
With regard to jury service we have three interesting cases. In 
Strauder v. West Virginia93 it was decided that a man convicted 
under a discriminatory jury law is denied the "equal protection of 
the law." In Virginia -:1· Rives94 it was held that a person is not 
entitled to trial by a jury composed in part of his own race. Judge 
Field's concurring opinion is of importance, for it foretold the down-
fall of the civil rights legislation by Congress. He held that an 
act of Congress attempting to give the United States courts juris-
diction to enforce state laws is unconstitutional. In Ex parte Vir-
g£nia95 an act of Congress providing that an officer who discrimi-
nat°ely selects jurors should be fined was held to be unconstitutional 
on the basis that it interfered with the purely local concerns of a 
state. 
The Civil Rights Cases96 completed the overthrow of the Second 
Civil Rights Bill. Two of these cases arose because colored per-
91 95 u. s. 485. 
02 Chief Justice Waite said: "But we think it may be safely said that 
- state legislation which seeks to impose a direct burden upon interstate com-
merce, or to interfere directly with its freedom, does encroach upon the 
exclusive power of Congress. The statute now under consideration, in our 
opinion, occupies that position. It does not act upon business through local 
instruments to be employed after coming within the state, but directly upon 
the business as it comes into or goes out from within." 
93 IOO U. 8. 303. 
94 IOO U. 8. 3I3. 
95 IOO U. S. 339· 
96 !09 u. s. 3. 
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sons were refused hotel accommodations ;97 two, because negroes 
were refused accommodations in theatres ;98 and the fifth, because 
a negro woman was refused the privilege of riding in the ladies' 
car.99 The court decided that in none of these cases was there 
ground for action, because the three amendments were prohibitions 
on states and not on individuals.100 
In the Ku Klux Cases101 the court decided that the amendments 
conferred no right of suffrage. Congress, however, could still guard 
against discrimination and protect people from such discrimina-
tion.102 
In Plessy v. Ferguson1Q3 the court upheld a law requiring separate 
coaches for white and colored passengers, saying that the Four· 
teenth Amendment could not "enforce social equality or a com-
mingling of the two races on terms unsatisfactory to either." Th~ 
test of such a law is reasonableness, and with regard to this th~ 
legislature has wide powers. In such a test the customs of the 
people have much to do with the decision.104 Such. a law, so long 
as equal accommodations are given, does not place one race in an 
97 U. S. v. Stanley and U. S. v. Nichols, 109 U. S. 3. 
98 U. S. v. Ryan and U. S. v. Singleton, 109 U. S. 3. 
99 Robinson and Wife v. Memphis, etc., .Ry. Co., 109 U. S. 3. 
10° Justice Bradley in rendering the decision said: "It does not authorize 
Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private 
rights, but to provide a mode of redress against the operation of state laws 
and the action of state officers, executive and judicial, when these are sub-
versive of the fundamental rights s~ified in the amendment." The reason 
for such a broad view being taken at this time may be found in the fact that 
the democrats had just returned to power, and no longer was there danger 
of anti-southern legislation on the part of Congress. 
101 IIO U. S. 651. 
102 These cases followed Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178, where 
it was decided that the amendments did not give women the right to vote. 
10 3 163 U. S. 537. The Supreme Court has held closely to the doctrine 
of this case. The most recent decision is Cincinnati, Covington & E. St. Ry. 
Co. v. Kentucky, 252 U. S. 408. 
1o4 The court said: "So far as conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment 
is concerned the case reduces itself to the question whether the statute of 
Louisiana is a reasonable regulation, and with respect to this there must 
necessarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature. In determin-
ing the question of reasonableness it is at liberty to act with reference to 
the established usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view 
to the promotion of their comfort and the preservation of public peace and 
good order." 
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inferior position.1>:> 5 The case of Chiles v. C. & 0. Ry. Co.1>:> 0 
extended the above principles. Here it was decided that in abi;ence 
of statutory authority a carrier may lawfully separate the races 
even in interstate transportation, and that if general sentiment sup-
ports a law it cannot be considered unreasonable.101 
The court seems to make a distinction between the r!ghts which 
tl).e police power may affect. ·'Jim Crow' legislation has been 
upheld because it is not discriminatory; but segregation ord?nancec;, 
although general sentiment certainly supports them, are illegal, and 
as the Constitution supports the right to "acquire, use, and Jispoc;e 
of" property, a city ordinance preventing a negro from living in a 
block where the majority of the people are white is unconstitutional 
as a violation of the clause that no "person shall be <leprived of 
property without due process of law."108 It is evident that at pres-
ent the court will uphold legislation of a racial character so long as 
it is not perfectly clear that the legislation does not expressly vio.: 
late some constitutional provision. 
'Legislation regarding aliens has been put on the same basis. 
Where there is no distinct violation of a constitutional provision the 
lQ5 In Berea College v: Commonwealth, 2II U. S. 45, it was decided, on 
the grounds of Plessy v. Ferguson, that a state might prohibit private schools 
and colleges from teaching the two races at the same time and place. 
lQS 218 u. s. 71. 
1QT ''Regulations which are induced by the general sentiment of the com-
munity for whom they are made and upon whom they operate cannot be 
said to be unreasonable." 
lQB Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. ~- The court said that the exercise 
of the police power "is not to be interfered with by the courts where it is 
within the scope of legislative authority and the means adopted reasonably 
tend to accomplish a lawful purpose. But it is equally well established that the 
police power, broad as it is, cannot justify the passage of a law or ordinance 
which runs counter to the limitations of the Federal Constitution." The 
court quotes Carey v. Atlanta, 143 Ga. 192, where, in speaking of Plessy v. 
Ferguson and Berea College v. Commonwealth, it was said: ''In each 
instance the complaining person was afforded the opportunity to ride, or to 
attend institutions of learning, or afforded the things of whatever nature to 
which in the particular case he was entitled. The most that was done was 
to require him, as a member of a class, to conform with reasonable rules in 
regard to the separation of the races. In none of them was he denied the 
right to use, control or dispose of his property, as in this case. Property 
of a person, whether as a member of a class or as an individual, cannot be. 
taken· without due process of law." 
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states may legislate on the subject by virtue of their police power. 
In Chy Lmzg v. Freenzan100 the court had before it a law of Cali- · 
fornia requiring that certain classes of foreigners, among them lewd 
women, should give bond on arrival to indemnify the state against 
liability for their support for two years. The court finds that 
America would stand no such action on the part of other countries, 
and that the control of such a subject lies with Congress; but that 
in absence of congressional action a state may protect itself in case 
of great emergency.110 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins111 the court held 
that a law requiring that no one should carry on a laundry business 
without permission was invalid. The court reached this conclusion, 
not because of anything inherently unconstitutional in the law, but 
because the board that gave licenses had for no legal reason with- . 
held them from all Chinese applicants, and the court held that when 
such a law is administered in an unequal and oppressive fashion a 
denial of equal justice as protected by the Constitution take~ place. 
In Patsone v. Pennsylvania112 the court held that an act making it 
unlawful for any alien to own a shotgun or rifle was constitutional. 
This law made it unlawful for any alien to kill any wild bird or . 
animal except in defense of person or property, and was upheld on 
the ground that a state has wide powers of classification and may 
. pass acts against that class from whom the evil is mainly to be 
feared. 
The last case which I shall mention in this connection is Trtea% 
v. Raicli,113 where the court declared a law, which happens to have 
been passed by the initiative and referendum, requiring employers 
of more than five persons to engage no more than 20 per cent aliens 
unconstitutional as denying to them as a class the equal protection 
of the laws. · 
In both negro and alien legislation an important consideration is 
109 92 u. s. 276. 
110 "Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise 
and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a state 
statute limited to provisions necessary and appropriate to that subject alone 
· shall in proper controversy come before us, it will be time enough to decide 
that question." 
111 u8 U. S. 356. 
112 232 u. s. 138. 
113 239 u. s. 33. 
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whether the law represents preponderant public opm10n and is a 
necessary exercise of the police power. But in either case if the 
law is a violation of some constitutional clause it does not stand. 
THI~ POLICE POWER AND THE RELATION OF EMPLOYER 
AND EMPLOYEE 
We come now to the newest development of the police power. 
Because of the conditions at the time, the police power early in its 
history was bound up with the slavery question. After the war it 
was primarily called up in cases of rate and negro legislation. At 
the present time trade unionism and other labor problems occupy 
the center of the stage, and that most useful power, the police power, 
ha~ been called upon to unravel the difficulty. 
The case of Barbier v. Connolly,114 while it does not refer to the 
relation of employer and employee serves as a basis for many of 
the later decisions. Here a law prohibiting washing in public laun-
dries from ten P. M. to six A. M. was upheld on the ground that this 
law was a valid exercise of the police power in that it was passed 
for purposes of health and safety. 115 The police power has had the 
effect of limiting the freedom of both employer and employee 
on the ground that an employee does not stand on an equal 
basis with the employer in bargaining for conditions of work, and 
that such regulation of their relations as promotes public health, 
safety and morals is constitutional. Up to 1898 we had decisions 
enforcing restrictions against producers in behalf of consumers, but 
from then on the health of the producer becomes a matter of public 
interest. Thus was liberty in making a contract restricted. In this 
year the case of Holden v. Hardy116 came before the court, and in 
rendering a decision the court came to the conclusion that an eight-
114 II3 U. S. 27. 
11G "But neither the amendment (Fourteenth), broad and comprehensive 
as it is, nor any other amendment was designed to interfere with the power 
of the state, sometimes termed its police power, to prescribe regulations, to 
promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, 
and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its 
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity. From the very necessities· 
of society, legislation of a special chara,cter having in view these objects 
must often be had in a certain district, such as draining marshes and irri-
gating arid plains; special burdens are often necessary for general benefits." 
116 16g u. s. 366. 
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hour law for miners was constitutional as being a measure for the 
promotion of health, for while in ordinary employment men might 
work a longer time, yet in such occupations as mining a man can-
not work for long hours without injury.117 The court, however, felt 
it necessary to explain that it took this action because of new con-
ditions.11s 
In order to protect the employee the court in the case of St. Louis, 
Iron Mt. & S. Ry. Co. v. Paitl,119 upheld a law requiring railroads 
111 "If it be within the power of the legislature to adopt such means 
(ventilation, etc.) for the protection of the lives of its citizens, it is difficult 
to see why precaution may not also be adopted for the protection of their 
health and morals. It is as much for the interest of the state that public 
health should be preserved as that life should be made secure. * * * While 
the general experience of mankind may justify us in believing that men may 
engage in ordinary employments more than eight hours per day without 
injury to health, it does not follow that labor of the same length of time 
is innocuous when carried on beneath the surface of the earth, where the 
operative is deprived of fresh air and sunlight, and is frequently subjected 
to foul atmosphere and a very high temperature, or to the influence of nox-
ious gases generated by the process of refining and smelting." 
11s In this connection the court said : "This court has not failed to rec-
ognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; 
that in some of the states methods of procedure which, at the time the con-
stitution was adopted, were deemed essential to the protection and safety 
of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no 
longer necessary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the 
conduct of individuals, or of classes of individuals, have proved detrimental 
to their interests, while, upon the other hand, certain other classes of per-
sons have been found to be in need of additional protection. '~ * '~ It is 
impossible to forecast the character or extent of these changes; but in view 
of the fact that, from the day Magna Charta was signed to the present 
moment, amendments to the structure of the law have been made with 
increasing frequency, it is impossible to suppose that they will not continue, 
and the law be forced to adopt itself to new conditions of society, and par-
ticularly to the new relations between employers and employees, as they arise." 
119 173 U. S. 404 This idea of protecting the employee through the police 
power has· extended to other employments in the matter of wages, until a 
state can make very nearly what rate regulation it pleases. In Mutual Loan 
Co. v. Martell, 222 U. S. 225, the court decided that a law invalidating the 
assignment of future wages without consent of the wage-earner's wife and 
employer did not deprive the man of due process of law. In Rail and River 
Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U. S. 338, it was held that a law under which coal 
miners, who are paid on the basis of weight, mus.t be paid according to all 
coal contained in the mine car in which it has been removed from the mine, 
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to pay at contract rates a discharged employee on the day of his dis-
charge. _ This decision was based on the fact that railroads, being 
clothed with a public trust, are under obligations to discharge duties 
which affect the public at large, and that in furtherance of public 
interest state legislatures might make laws for the benefit of 
employees, even though such laws limited the right of freedom of 
contract. 
In Atkin v. Kansas120 a law establishing an eight-hour day for 
both direct and contract work in public employments was upheld 
on the ground that a state can prescribe conditions of work done 
for it or for its municipalities.121 Similar decisions have been given 
with regard to restriction of hours of railroad employees, for the 
railroad business affects public safety.122 If legislation of this kind 
· made by a state conflicts with that made by Congress, the state legis-
lation falls.123 The upholding of the Adamson law124 was based 
by the court on the principle that the law was an extension of hour 
legislation to all interstate railroad employees. The regulation of 
Congress naturally e.'Ctends only to those employed in interstate 
commerce and to those employed by the government. 
While a state might regulate hours of work in non-dangerous 
provided no greater per cent of dfrt, etc., shall be contained than is avoid-
able, and providing that the system of docking is not done away with, does 
not violate the right to enter into contract. In McLean v. Arkansas, 2II U. 
S. 539, it was decided that a legislature may prescribe particular methods of 
compensation. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549: By 
police power reasonable restraints may be placed on the freedom of contract. 
120 191 u. s. 207. 
1 21 "It belongs to the state, as guardian and trustee for its people, and 
having control of its affairs, to prescribe the conditions upon which it will 
permit work to be done on its behalf or on behalf of its municipalities." 
122 B. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S. 612: 
"In its power suitably to provide for the safety of employees and travelers, 
Congress was not limited to the enactment of laws relating to mechanical 
appliances, but it was also competent to consider and to _endeavor to reduce 
the dangers incident to the strain of excessive hours of duty on the part of 
engineers," etc. 
1 2a Erie Ry. Co. v. N. Y., 233 U. S. 671: ''Where there is a conflict the 
state legislation must give way. Indeed, when Congress acts in such a way 
as to manifest its purpose to exercise its constitutional authority the regu-
lating power of the state ceases to exist." 
- 124 Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. 
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public employments, the court did not at once come to the conclu-
sion that it could do so in private employments. In Lochner v. 
New York125 the court held that a law restricting hours of work 
in a bakery was t,tnconstitutional. This case differs from Holden v. 
Hardy in that here there is no hazardous employment. The burden 
of proof is placed on the state in defending a law which affects 
liberty as defined in Allgeyer v. Louisiana. The police power could 
be called upon to support only a law referring to public health, 
safety and morals. But in the case of Bunting v. Oregon126 the 
Lochner case, except for unusual violations of liberty, was over-
thrown. Here a law limiting men's hours of work to ten hours a 
day in general factory work was upheld. The court had to be con-
vinced that such a law was supported by general public opinion 
and that it was for the general welfare of the community. So a 
state may now bring forward police power, including general wel-
fare, in support of its hours of work legislation. 
The court has been more liberal in enforcing laws regulating 
·hours of work of women, and here they have taken into consid-
eration that in the case of women long hours are likely to prove 
very detrimental. In Muller v. Oregon127 a ten-hour law for women 
working in mechanical establishments, factories or laundries was 
upheld as being a health measure.128 In Miller v. Wilson129 this 
principle was adhered to and a law forbidding women to work 
more than eight hours a day in hotels was upheld, despite the plea 
of class legislation and discrimination. The court, however, admit-
ted that such legislation might go beyond the bounds of reason, but 
they held this to be a reasonable regulation. Thus, we see that the 
right to enter freely into a contract has been restricted throug!i the 
125 198 u. s. 45. 
126 243 u. s. ¢. 
127 2o8 u. s. 412. 
128 "As healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical 
well-being of women becomes an object of public interest and care in order 
to preserve the strength and vigor of the race. * * * The limitation which 
this statute imposes upon her contractual powers, upon her right to agree 
with her employer as to the time when she shall labor, are not imposed solely 
for her benefit, but also for tpe benefit of all." 
129 236 u. s. 373. 
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police power of the state on the ground that a state must protect its 
citizens who are employed. 
It has become established that an employer may not be prevented 
from discharging a man because of union membership. The ques-
tion first came up in Adair v. United States.130 An act of Congress 
declaring that no man engaged in interstate commerce might be dis-
charged because of union membership was held to be unconstitu-
tional because violating liberty as protected by the Constitution. A 
state law of the same nature was held to be unconstitutional in the 
case of Coppage v. Kansas.131 The court has also held that where 
a man has signed an agreement stating that he will not join a union 
all efforts made to persuade him to join are illegal.132 
The most recent development of legislation by virtue of the police 
power is found in the various compensation and employer's liability 
acts. Maryland adopted the first of these acts in 1902, and two 
years later it was declared unconstitutional by the state court.133 
The first general law was enacted by New York in r9ro. This law 
provided for compulsory compensation in certain hazardous employ-
ments. In the case of Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co.134 the consti-
tutionality of the law was tested in the state court. The court held, 
as did the United States Supreme Court at this time,135 that a state 
legislature might modify the three common law defenses of con-
130 208 U. S. J61. 
1a1236 U. S. 1. "A statutory provision which is not a legitimate police 
regulation cannot be made such by being placed in the same act with a 
police regulation or by being enacted under a title that declares a purpose 
which would be a proper object for exercise of that power. * * * Mere 
restriction of liberty or of property rights cannot of itself be denominated 
'public welfare' and treated as a legitimate object of police power." 
132 Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229. 
133 Franklin v. Union Rys. and Electric Co. of Baltimore (Not reported. 
See BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Ed. 2, vol. 1, p. 9). 
134 201 N. Y. 271. 
135 L. & N. v. Melton, 218 U. S. 36. The court upheld a law making 
railroad companies liable for injuries to an employee resulting from negli-
gence of a fellow employee under whom he was working. Chicago B. & Q. 
Ry. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549: The court upheld a law abolishing the 
fellow servant rule on railroads and denying effect to any contract restrict-
ing liability or acceptance of any insurance brought against the railroad by 
their employees. 
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tributary negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant 
doctrine, and it also held that classification for purposes of regu-
lation under the police power is a legislative function, and cannot 
be interfered with unless it is so unreasonable as to violate the Con-
stitution. But the court held that as this law in part provided a 
mandatory rule, and that it takes the property of the employer with-
out regard to whether he was at fault or not, it is unconstitutional. 
The Second Employers Liability Cases136 followed former cases 
as to the legality of modifying common law defenses, and decided 
that Congress could regulate the liability of common carriers by 
railroad to their employees, and that such regulation extended to 
the intrastate commerce of interstate carriers, and that such regu-
lation superseded all state regulations. The case of C. & 0. Ry. 
Co. v. De Atley131 decided that it was not a part of an employee's 
duty to discover extraordinary risks.138 The final development of 
the principles determining the constitutionality of compensation 
laws took place in 1917. In the case of New York Central R.Y· Co. 
v. White139 the court decided that a compulsory compensation law 
which, in lieu of common law liability upon employers to make 
compensation for disabling, etc., workers, except where injury is 
willful or the worker drunk, is constitutional.140 The decision in 
the case of Mountain Tintber Co. v. Washingt01i141 follows the 
above decision. 
13~ 223 U. S. I. 
137 241 u. s. 310. 
1as In the case of Chicago, K I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ward, 252 U. S. 18, this 
case was followed. The court said: "According to our decisions the settled 
rule is not that it is the duty of an employee to exercise care to discover 
extraordinary dangers that may arise from the negligence of the employer 
or of those for whose conduct the employer is responsible, but that the 
employee may assume that the employer or his agents have exercised proper 
care with respect to his safety until notified to the contrary, unless the 
want of care and the danger arising from it are so obvious that an ordinarily 
careful person, under the circumstances, would observe and appreciate them." 
139 243 u. s. 188. 
140 A law "regulating the responsibility of employers for injury or death 
of employees, arising out of the employment, bears so close a relation to the 
protection of the lives and safety of those concerned that they properly may 
be regarded as coming within the category of police regulations." 
141 243 u. s. 219. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Hastings, in summing up his article, says: 
"The suggestion of ·Marshall was put forward to serve a 
need to enable the slave states to minister to their peculiar in-
stitutions, while national authority was nevertheless enforced. 
It was done almost involuntarily by judges who used it 
because it lay at hand and was available. Then it was used 
in the states to resist extravagant claims of property and 
corporate rights and to extend restraints over the liquor 
traffic. After the Civil War it was needed again for the. 
same purpose to enable the states to maintain their autonomy 
against the reconstruction legislation of Congress and the 
new amendments; and, again, it was involuntarily seized 
upon and crowded into the gap. 
"In such use it was so wrought upon legislation that it 
finally triumphed over the bill of rights almost completely, 
but the Fourteenth Amendment, almost wholly balked by our 
legal habits of its intended effect as to the negro race, was 
turned by those habits to the accomplishment of purposes 
in relation to property and legislation that the framers of it 
did not remotely conceive." 
To this we might add that as the labor situation has become more 
and more acute the police power has been stretched to the point 
where not only hours of labor are regulated by it, but the old com-
mon law defenses by which an employer might protect himself have 
been rendered useless,142 
The police power has served the states well, and through it they 
142 li,• th' case of Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer, 250 U. S. 400, the 
court said: "'The decisions (Second Employer's Liability Cases, N. Y. Cen-
tral Ry. Co. v. White and Mountain Timber Co. v. White) have established 
the propositions that the rules of law concerning the employer's responsi-
bility for personal injury or death of an employee arising in the course of 
the employment, is not beyond alteration by legislation in the public interest; 
that no person has a vested right entitling him to have these any more than 
other rules of law remain unchanged for his benefit; and that if we exclude 
arbitrary and unreasonable changes, liability may be imposed upon the 
employer without fault, and the rules respecting his responsibility to one 
emplOyee for the negligence of another, and respecting contributory negli-
gence and assumption of risk, are subject to legislative change." 
POLICE POWER OF THE STATE 213 
have been able to maintain their authority. By it the South was · 
able to preserve her civilization, and onlY. through it can she hope 
to ward off the terrible danger of partial and in some cases com-
plete negro control. The founders cif our Constitution never 
expected such a condition to arise as that in which the South is now 
placed. Had they foreseen it the Constitution would never have 
been adopted without provisions to protect the Southern States. 
The Supreme Court to the best of its ability has filled their places. 
But in other respects, particularly with reference to property rights 
and other constitutional guarantees, the states have been given a 
tremendous amount of power. The acts passed by virtue of the 
police power are legal, and when police power is held to contain 
"what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality 
or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately 
necessary to the public welfare" the outcome is hard to see. Par-
ticularly at this time, when radicalism and Bolshevism are prepon-
derant~ our constitutional provisions vanish should opinion suddenly 
or even gradually change. Justice Strong foresaw this condition 
of affairs when he dissented in the decision rendered in the case of 
1lfonn v. Illinois. In speaking of the effects of this decision, he said: 
"If this be sound law, if there be no protection, either in 
the principles upon which our republican government is 
founded or in the prohibitions of the Constitution against 
such invasion of private rights, all property and all business 
in the state are held at the mercy of the majority of the 
legislature." 
When we see a portion of the world gone over to sovietism, and 
we hear the increasing cry for socialism in this country, we cannot 
do better than tum back to the words of Chief Justice Marshall : 
"Whatever respect,might have been felt for the state sov-
ereignty, it is not to be disguised that the framers of the 
Constitution viewed with some apprehension the violent acts 
which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and 
that the people of the United States, in adopting that instru-
ment, have manifested a determination to shield themselves 
and their property from the effect of those sudden and 
strong passions to which men ·are exposed." 
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(All reference to the recent growth of a national police power 
as developed in Arver v. United States, 245 U. S. 366, H 111milton v. 
Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U. S. 146, and Rup-
pert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, has been purposely omitted. This 
growth has taken place in connection with other changes wrought 
by _the war, and whether it will survive or not remains to be seen.) 
Cou,rns DENNY, JR. 
Princeton University. 
